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ABSTRACT  
Wagner’s Law is the first model of public spending in the history of public finance. The study 
tests the validity of Wagner’s Law that there is a long-run tendency for public expenditure to 
grow relative to national income. This implies that public expenditure can be treated as an 
endogenous factor, not a cause of growth in national income. In contrast, Keynesian 
hypothesis treats public expenditure as an exogenous factor. “Augmented” version of 
Wagner’s Law, where public deficit appears as further explanatory variable, is also 
investigated. Assessing the empirical evidence of these hypotheses in Nigeria, for the period 
1970-2012, the study employed Johansen Cointegration Techniques with its associated Error 
Correction Model for the short run dynamics. We found bi-directional causal relation for the 
short run dynamics for five out of seven formulations while the long run empirical evidence 
seems to be most favourable to Wagner’s hypothesis rather than the Keynesian one, therefore 
suggesting that causality run from real income to government expenditure. 
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1. Introduction 
The relationship between government expenditure and economic growth has continued to 
generate series of debate among scholars. Broadly, government performs two functions - 
protection (security) and provisions of certain public goods (Abdullah, 2000 and Al-Yousif, 
2000). Protection function consists of the creation of rule of law, enforcement of property 
rights and protection of life and property while provision of public goods include defense, 
roads, education, health, power and so on. A point of debate among economists is whether 
the public sector should intervene or not in the short-term fluctuations in economic activity. 
The classical economists believed that market forces were able to quickly bring economies to 
long-run equilibrium, through adjustments in the labor market; therefore they always opposed 
public sector intervention. However, the Keynesians took the fallibility of such self-
regulatory mechanisms proposed by the classical economist, precisely because of rigidities in 
the labor market and thus prescribed Keynesian expansionary fiscal policies to support the 
economy during recessions (Magazzino, 2010). To this end we have two propositions on the 
relationship between public sector expenditure and national income - Wagner’s law and 
Keynesian hypothesis. According to Wagner (1883) when the economic activity grows there 
is a tendency for the government activities to increase in long-run while in Keynesian 
hypothesis, government spending is an exogenous policy instrument that cause changes in 
aggregate level of real output in the short-run. Keynes therefore posits that the causality of 
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the relationship between public expenditure and national income runs from expenditure to 
income. 
Extensive empirical analysis of the Wagner’s law has produced mixed results in the 
literature. While some studies (Wagner and Weber, 1977; Al-Faris, 2002; Chang, 2002; 
Aregbeyen, 2006; Omoke, 2009; Abizadeh and Gray, 1985) have found support for the 
Wagner’s Law, some other studies (Ram, 1986; Afxentiou and Serletis, 1996;  Abizadeh and 
Yousefi, 1998; Burney, 2002; Huang, 2006; Ergun and Tuck, 2006; Babatunde, 2007) have 
found a non-existence or weak support for the Law. The empirical studies such as Abu-Bader  
and  Abu-Qarn (2003) found a bidirectional causality between the public spending and 
national income. Some studies yet found no support for neither Wagner nor Keynes (e.g 
Muhlis and Hakan, 2003; Singh and Sahni, 1984; Dakurah, Davies and Sampath, 2001).  
The main aim of this paper is to re-investigate the Wagner’s hypothesis for Nigeria 
using more specification of the model. Earlier studies are limited in scope and their results are 
mixed. For instance,  Essien (1997) considered only three specifications of the model of 
Wagner’s hypothesis, Aregbeyen (2006) considered only a single specification of the model 
and Babatunde (2007) used the five different versions of the Wagner’s law. This study 
contributes to knowledge by considering the seven specifications of the Wagner’s model 
common in the literature for Nigeria.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: the next section we present the 
trend of public expenditure in Nigeria while section three discusses the analytical framework 
on which the models are predicated. The data and methodology is presented in section four 
and it is followed by results and interpretation in section five. Finally, section six concludes 
this study.  
 
2. Trend of Public Expenditure in Nigeria 
The magnitude of public expenditure is one of the applied ways to measure the size of 
government in the whole economy. Hence, it is necessary to compare the magnitude with 
something else that can enable us to get a glance idea about its size of public sector. In Figure 
1, we introduce a time series data of public expenditure in a real term for the period of 1970-
2012. 
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Figure 1:              Real Public Expenditures, 1970 - 2012
 
 
Figure 2 presents magnitude of both public expenditure and GDP in real terms. 
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Figure 2:            Real Public Expenditure and Real GDP, 1970 - 2012
 
 
Comparing long-run increases in public expenditure with the trend of real gross domestic 
product, it seems that the variables of interest have a one-way directional trend which gives 
the impression of what Wagner’s law suggests. However, this is an early assumption and 
cannot be ascertain yet. Therefore, we need to measure in percentage the ratio of public 
expenditure to GDP, which would provide us an indication of resources the whole economy 
can make available to the public sector. These ratios are presented with Figure 3. 
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Figure 3:              Public Expenditures as a ratio of GDP, 1970 -2012
 
 
As seen in the figure 3, public expenditure as a ratio to GDP reached peaks of 20.4% in 1972, 
29.5% in 1976, 30.2% in 1980, 23.5% in 1986, 22.5% in 1990, 34.2% in 1993, 29.7% in 
1999 and 21.5% in 2001. During the period of 1970 – 2012, public expenditure was on 
average 18.7 percent of GDP, lowest at 10.4 % in 2006 and highest at 34.2% in 1993. The 
ratio of public expenditure to GDP depicted in Figure 3 provides yet inconclusive analysis 
with regard to which hypothesis actually fit into Nigeria economy – Wagnerian or Keynesian. 
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3. Wagner’s Law 
Wagner Law investigates the long-run relationship between government expenditure and 
economic growth. However, alternative strands of the literature have tested several versions 
of Wagner’s Law, using different variables to approximate the theoretical variables of 
government expenditure and economic growth. There are six broad versions of Wagner’s 
Law, which define the relationship between economic growth and public expenditure. In all 
the six, some variant of the measure of national income explains alternate measures of public 
sector expenditure. The causation, however, could be in the reverse direction in each of these 
six models. There is no objective criterion to decide which of the six versions is the most 
suitable and convincing test of the Law. Here, in table 1, six alternative functional forms of 
the law are being examined, plus the modified Musgrave’s version of Wagner’s Law: 
 
Number Function of Form Version 
1 LRGex =  + ΨLRGDP Peacock and Wiseman (1967) 
2 LRGex =  + ψL(RGDP/P) Goffman (1968) 
3 LRGCex =  + ΨLRGDP Pryor (1968) 
4 L(RGex/RGDP) = + ψL(RGDP/P) Musgrave (1969) 
5 L(RGex/P) =  + ψL(RGDP/P) Gupta (1967) 
6 L(RGex/RGDP) =  + ψLRGDP Modified P-W version by 
 Mann (1980) 
7 L(RGex/RGDP) =  + ψL(RGDP/P)  
+ θL(BD/RGDP) 
Amplified Musgrave (1969) version  
by Murthy (1994) 
 
Where; 
LRGex => is the logarithm of real total government expenditure 
LRGCex => is the logarithm of real government consumption expenditure 
LRGDP => is the logarithm of real gross domestic product 
L(RGDP/P) => is the logarithm of per capita real gross domestic product 
L(RGex/RGDP)=> is the logarithm of the ratio of real total government expenditure to real 
gross domestic product 
L(RGex/P)=> is the logarithm of the per capita real total government expenditure 
L(BD/RGDP)=> is the logarithm of the ratio of budget deficit to real gross domestic product 
and P is the population.  
The first formulation was adopted by Peacock and Wiseman (1967), who interpreted the 
Wagner’s law as follows: “public expenditures should increase by a higher rate than GDP”. 
Goffman (1968) expressed the law in the following way: “during the development process, 
the GDP per capita increase should be lower than the rate of public sector activities increase” 
(see Model II). Pryor in 1968 developed the third version of the Law, which states that the 
consumption component of government expenditure increases with the rise in national 
income. Musgrave (1969), in the fourth specification, says the government expenditure share 
to GDP is increasing as the real GDP per capita rises, during the development process. The 
fifth version of the model, which is per capita total public sector expenditure rising with per 
capita national income, was tested by Gupta (1967). While, Mann (1980) defined the law as 
rise in the share of total government expenditure in the national income as a result of growth 
in national income. Of the six versions of Wagner’s Law, the last formulation is often used 
and is considered to be most appropriate one (Halicioglu, 2005). The last formulation of 
Wagner’s Law suggested by economic literature, is an amplified Musgrave (1969) version 
tested by Murthy (1994). The inclusion of the last explanatory variable into the specification 
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is justified on the basis that it reduces the omitted variable bias and misspecification in 
econometric estimations and more so, the addition of budget deficit variable does not 
contradict the tenet of the law. The existence of long run relationship among the variables in 
the models is a confirmation of the Wagner law. 
 
4. Data and Methodology 
The empirical analysis was presented by time series model. The study uses long and up-to-
date annual time-series data (1970-2012), with a total of 43 observations for each variable. 
The data for the study are obtained from Central Bank of Nigeria Statistical Bulletin and 
Annual Report and Statements of Account for different years. We employ Fully Modified 
ordinary least square (FMOLS) method. The software application utilized was E-views 7.0. 
 
Granger causality test 
The Granger causality test was developed by Granger (1969), and according to him, a 
variable (in this case RGex) is said to Granger cause another variable (RGDP) if past and 
present values of real total government expenditure (RGex) help to predict real national 
income (RGDP). To test whether RGex Granger cause RGDP, this paper applies the causality 
test developed by Granger (1969). A simple Granger causality test involving two variables, 
RGex and RGDP is written as: 
 
RGext  = j RGext-j +  jRGDPt-j +    (1) 
 
RGDPt  = j RGext-j +  jRGDPt-j + γ   (2) 
 
The null hypotheses to be tested are: 
H1: ηj = 0: j=1...... p,this hypothesis mean that government expenditure does not Granger 
cause national income. 
H2: βj = 0: j=1...... p, this hypothesis means that national income does not Granger cause 
government expenditure. 
If none of the hypothesis is rejected, it means that RGex does not Granger cause 
RGDP and RGDP also does not Granger cause RGex. It indicates that the two variables are 
independent of each other. If the first hypothesis is rejected, it shows that RGex Granger 
causes RGDP. Rejection of the second hypothesis means that the causality runs from RGDP 
to RGex. If all hypotheses are rejected, there is bi-directional causality between RGex and 
RGDP. We re-specify equation (1) as (2) and estimate the models as; 
 
RGext = θ + δRGDPt + ut     (3) 
RGDPt =  + ηRGext + t     (4) 
 
We start this analysis by first examining the stationarity of our variables, nominal interest rate 
and expected inflation. A non-stationary time series has a different mean at different points in 
time, and its variance increases with the sample size (Harris and Sollis (2003). A 
characteristic of non-stationary time series is very crucial in the sense that the linear 
combinations of these time series make spurious regression. In the case of spurious 
regression, t-values of the coefficients are highly significant, coefficient of determination 
(R2) is very close to one and the Durbin Watson (DW) statistic value is very low, which often 
lead investigators to commit a high frequency of Type 1 errors (Granger and Newbold, 1974). 
In that case, the results of the estimation of the coefficient became biased. Therefore it is 
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necessary to detect the existence of stationarity or non-stationarity in the series to avoid 
spurious regression. For this, the unit root tests are conducted using the Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) test and Philips-Perron (PP). If a unit root is detected for more than one 
variable, we further conduct the test for cointegration to determine whether we should use 
Error Correction Mechanism. 
 
Cointegration Analysis 
Cointegration can be defined simply as the long-term, or equilibrium, relationship between 
two series. This makes cointegration an ideal analysis technique to validate the Wagner law: 
by ascertaining the existence of a long-term relationship between real total government 
expenditure (RGex) and real national income (RGDP). Cointegration analysis can thereby 
establish if RGex variables are cointergrated with RGDP variables. The cointegration method 
by Johansen (1991; 1995) has become the almost always cited cointegration technique used 
in Wagner Law’s studies, and is used in this study. The Vector Autoregression (VAR) based 
cointegration test methodology developed by Johansen (1991; 1995) is described as follows; 
The procedure is based on a VAR of order p: 
yt= A1 yt-1+... + Apyt-p+ Bzt+ t    (5) 
whereytis a vector of non-stationary I(1) variables (interest rate and expected inflation), ztis a 
vector of deterministic variables and  tis a vector of innovations. The VAR may therefore be 
reformulated as: 
 
yt= П yt-1+ Γiyt-p  + Bzt+ t   (6) 
 
Where П = i –I     (7) 
andΓi =  j     (8) 
 
Estimates of Γicontain information on the short-run adjustments, while estimates of Π contain 
information on the long-run adjustments, in changes in yt. The number of linearly dependent 
cointegrating vectors that exist in the system is referred to as the cointegrating rank of the 
system. This cointegrating rank may range from 1 to n-1 (Greene 2000). There are three 
possible cases in which Πyt-1 ~ I (0) will hold. Firstly, if all the variables in ytare I (0), this 
means that the coefficient matrix Π has r=n linearly independent columns and is referred to as 
full rank. The rank of Π could alternatively be zero: this would imply that there are no 
cointegrating relationships. The most common case is that the matrix Π has a reduced rank 
and there are r<(n−1) cointegrating vectors present in β . This particular case can be 
represented by: 
 
Π =αβ′       (9) 
 
whereα andβ are matrices with dimensions n x r and each column of matrix α contains 
coefficients that represent the speed of adjustment to disequilibrium, while matrix β contains 
the long-run coefficients of the cointegrating relationships.  
In this case, testing for cointegration entails testing how many linearly independent 
columns there are in Π , effectively testing for the rank of Matrix Π 
(Harris, 1995).If we solve the eigenvalue specification of Johansen (1991), we obtain 
estimates of the eigenvalues λ1> … >λr> 0 and the associated eigenvectors β = (ν1, …νr). The 
co-integrating rank, r, can be formally tested with two statistics. The first is the maximum 
eigenvalue test given as: 
7 | P a g e  
 
   λ- max = -T ln (1- λr+1),  .    (10) 
 
Where the appropriate null is r = g cointegrating vectors against the alternative that r ≤ g+1. 
The second statistic is the trace test and is computed as: 
 
λ-trace = -T ,      (11) 
 
where the null being tested is r = g against the more general alternative r ≤ n. The distribution 
of these tests is a mixture of functional of Brownian motions that are calculated via numerical 
simulation by Johansen and Juselius (1990) and Osterwald-Lenum (1992). Cheung and Lai 
(1993) use Monte Carlo methods to investigate the small sample properties of Johansen’s λ-
max and λ-trace statistics. In general, they find that both the λ-max and-λ trace statistics are 
sensitive to under parameterization of the lag length although they are not so to over 
parameterization. They suggest that Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) or Schwarz 
Bayesian Criterion (SBC) can be useful in determining the correct lag length.  
Granger (1988) demonstrates that causal relations among variables can be examined 
within the framework of ECM, with cointegrated variables. While the short run dynamics are 
captured by the individual coefficients of the lagged terms, the error correction term (ECT) 
contains the information of long run causality. Significance of lagged explanatory variable 
depicts short run causality while a negative and statistical significant ECT is assumed to 
signify long run causality (Bannerjee and Newman, 1998). We specify the general error 
correction term as follows; 
 
LGext  =  δ + γ1LGext-1 + γ2LRGDPt + μt               (12) (from equation 1) 
μt  =  LGext  - δ - γ1LGext-1  -  γ2LRGDPt      (13) 
 
where μt is the residual term and γ is a cointegrating coefficient. From equation (13), we can 
formulate a simple ECM as: 
 
LGext  =  φ1 + φ2LGext-1 +  φ3LRGDPt + μt-1 + νt    (14) 
Specifically from the ECM expressed in equation (14), φ captures any immediate, short term 
or contemporaneous effect that the real income has on the government expenditure. The 
coefficient γi reflects the long-run equilibrium effect of current income and previous 
government expenditure on current government expenditure and the absolute value of  
decides how quickly the equilibrium is restored.  
 
5. Results and Interpretation 
 
Stationary Test 
Appropriate tests have been developed by Augmented Dickey and Fuller (ADF) and Phillips 
and Perron (1988) to test whether a time series has a unit root. Tables 1 therefore provide the 
results of the unit root tests.  
 
Table 1: Results of (ADF) and (PP) unit root test 
 Constant and Linear Trend 
Variable level ADF Test PP 
LRGDP 0.8019 0.8328 
LGex 0.2027 0.2123 
L(RGDP/P) 0.8046 0.8355 
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L(RGex/RGDP) 0.0035*** 0.0051*** 
LRCex 0.9627 0.9559 
L(RGex/P) 0.2072 0.2167 
BD/RGDP 0.1814 0..1814 
∆LRGDP 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
∆LGex 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
∆L(RGDP/P) 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
∆L(RGex/RGDP) - - 
∆LRCex 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
∆L(RGex/P) 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
∆(BD/RGDP) 0.0036*** 0.0000*** 
1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*) 
 
ADF and PP tests result with constant and linear trend, shows that all the variables is 
stationary at first differences except the logarithm of the ratio of real government expenditure 
to real gross domestic product. Hence, we conclude that these variables are integrated of 
order 1.  
 
Cointegration Test 
 
Table 2: Results for Johansen and Juselius cointegration test. 
Model  Null 
Hypothesis 
Alternative  
Hypothesis 
P – Value of  
Trace Statistics 
P – Value of  
Max-Eigen Statistics 
I r=0 r=1 0.1240 0.0871* 
 r=1 r=2 0.8094 0.8094 
 
II r=0 r=1 0.1105 0.0989* 
 r=1 r=2 0.3739 0.3739 
 
III r=0 r=1 0.7214 0.6424 
 r=1 r=2 0.9370 0.9370 
 
IV r=0 r=1 0.4615 0.4216 
 r=1 r=2 0.5056 0.5056 
 
V r=0 r=1 0.4615 0.4216 
 r=1 r=2 0.5056 0.5056 
 
VI r=0 r=1 0.1240 0.0871* 
 r=1 r=2 0.8094 0.8094 
 
VII r=0 r=1 0.1925 0.1884 
 r=1 r=2 0.5175 0.5111 
*, ** Denotes rejection of the null hypothesis at 0.05 and 0.10 levels 
 
 
Following from the results presented in tables 1, the Johansen and Juselius cointegration test 
on the 7 models show no evidence of long run relationship between the variable of interest 
under trace statistic test, which partly confirms the findings of Essien (1997) who could not 
establish a long run relationship between government size and economic growth in Nigeria. 
However models I, II and VI show that show a cointegration rank of one in under max-eigen 
value test at 10% significance level. This suggests that real income and government 
expenditure move together in those models. Since the existence of a long-run relationship has 
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been established, the short-run dynamics of the model can be established within an error 
correction model.  
 
Error Correction Mechanism (VECM): 
 
In order to check the stability of the model, we estimated the vector error correction model 
(VECM). The results of VECM are presented in Table 3.  
 
Table 3: Result of Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) 
  Model I Model II Model III 
Variable  D(LRGex) D(LRGDP) D(LRGex) D(LRGDP/P) D(LRCex) D(LRGDP) 
C 0.0251 
(0.5066) 
0.0513* 
(0.0894) 
0.0366 
(0.3149) 
0.0108 
(0.6971) 
0.0142 
(0.7572) 
0.0480 
(0.1268) 
D(LRGex)t-1 0.0590 
(0.6606) 
- -0.0069 
(0.9563) 
- - - 
D(LRGDP)t-1 - -0.2797* 
(0.0926) 
- - - -0.1362 
(0.4097) 
D(LRGDP/P)t-1 - - - -0.1742 
(0.2965) 
- - 
D(LRCex)t-1 - - - - 0.1293 
(0.4159) 
- 
D(LRGex)t - 0.2692** 
(0.0191) 
- 0.3235*** 
(0.0033) 
- - 
D(LRGDP)t 0.4071** 
(0.0431) 
- - - 0.3562 
(0.1397) 
- 
D(LRGDP/P)t - - 0.5405*** 
(0.0070) 
- - - 
D(LRCex)t
 
- - - - - 0.1721 
(0.1170) 
ECM(-1) -0.6839*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0044 
(0.9687) 
-0.6130*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.2210 
(0.1444) 
-0.1831** 
(0.0489) 
-0.0733 
(0.4133) 
R2 
S.E of equation 
Pro(F-statistic) 
0.4369 
0.2295 
0.0000 
0.1899 
0.1767 
0.0482 
0.4567 
0.2254 
0.0000 
0.2353 
0.1720 
0.0180 
0.1447 
0.2806 
0.1185 
0.0946 
0.1868 
0.2925 
  
 
 Model IV Model V 
Variable  D(L(RGex/RGDP)) D(L(RGDP/P) D(L(RGex/P)) D(L(RGDP/P) 
C 0.0079 
(0.8374) 
0.0190 
(0.5119) 
0.0107 
(0.7847) 
0.0237 
(0.4053) 
D(L(RGex/RGDP))t-1 -0.1645 
(0.2980) 
- - - 
D(L(RGDP/P)t-1 - 0.0166 
(0.9229) 
- -0.2480 
(0.1547) 
D(L(RGex/P))t-1 - - -0.0087 
(0.9509) 
- 
D(L(RGDP/P)t -0.5599** 
(0.0106) 
- 0.4149** 
(0.0558) 
- 
D(L(RGex/P))t - - - 0.2803*** 
(0.0095) 
D(L(RGex/RGDP))t - -0.2051* 
(0.0649) 
- - 
ECM(-1) -0.4017** 
(0.0152) 
-0.1432 
(0.1326) 
-0.4862*** 
(0.0016) 
-0.0553 
(0.6785) 
R2 0.3460 0.1500 0.3442 0.1939 
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S.E of equation 
F-statistics 
0.2444 
0.0011 
0.1810 
0.1071 
0.2480 
0.0012 
0.1765 
0.0443 
 
 
 Model VI Model VII 
Variable  D(L(RGex/RGDP)
) 
D(LRGDP
) 
D(L(RGex/RGDP)
) 
D(L(RGDP/P)
) 
D(BD/RGDP
) 
C 0.0264 
(0.4821) 
0.0464 
(0.1279) 
0.0151 
(0.6452) 
0.0176 
(0.5481) 
0.4892 
(0.6191) 
D(L(RGex/RGDP))
t-1 
-0.0674 
(0.6600) 
- 0.0066 
(0.9617) 
- - 
D(LRGDP)t-1 - -0.0053 
(0.9749) 
- - - 
D(L(RGDP/P))t-1 - - - -0.0512 
(0.7797) 
- 
D(BD/RGDP)t-1 - - - - 0.1000 
(0.5699) 
D(LRGDP)t -0.5866*** 
(0.0048) 
- - - - 
D(L(RGDP/P))t - - -0.4640** 
(0.0120) 
- 5.2603 
(0.3604) 
D(L(RGex/RGDP))
t 
- -0.2420** 
(0.0405) 
- -0.1342 
(0.2443) 
-8.0331* 
(0.0507) 
D(BD/RGDP)t - - -0.0092* 
(0.0811) 
0.0053 
(0.2702) 
- 
ECM(-1) -0.6148*** 
(0.0012) 
-0.1105 
(0.1473) 
-0.8546*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.1427 
(0.1928) 
-0.3934** 
(0.0140) 
R2 
S.E of Eq 
F-statistics 
0.4231 
0.2295 
0.0001 
0.1473 
0.1813 
0.1127 
0.5474 
0.2061 
0.0000 
0.1602 
0.1827 
0.1674 
0.2042 
6.1068 
0.0765 
 
The results presented in table 3 shows that the short run dynamics of Models I, II, IV, V and 
VI suggest that causality run from real income to government expenditure and vice versa i.e 
there is feedback mechanism between the variables. In spite of the different measures used to 
capture government expenditure and national income in the models of Peacock and Wiseman 
(1967), Goffman (1968), Musgrave (1969), Gupta (1967) and Mann (1980), the associated 
relationship between government expenditure and national income is the same. These results 
are in consonance with Aigbokhan (1996) who investigated the impact of government size 
(measured as expenditure share of GDP) on economic growth between 1960 and 1993 for 
Nigeria;  
In the third version of the Wagner Law developed by Pryor (1968), the result revealed 
that there is no short run relationship between the consumption component of government 
expenditure and national income in Nigeria. This wagner’s law formulation posit no 
empirical support either for the Wagner’s Law or the Keynesian hypothesis. 
However, Augmented Musgrave (1969) version by Murthy (1994), suggested a bi-
directional causal relationship between government expenditure and budget deficit variables. 
Also model VII revealed a uni-directional causality that causality run from real income to 
government expenditure, thus supporting Wagner’s law for Nigeria. Our finding is similar to 
the outcome of a study by Aregbeyen (2006), using Johansen cointegration and standard 
causality tests found a unidirectional causality from national income to total public 
expenditure i.e. a support for Wagner’s Law.  
The insignificance of the lagged residual term (ECM) in the national income 
equations and its significance in the government expenditure equations for all the models (I - 
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VII) conclusively settles the question of long run causality, regardless of the joint 
significance of the cross-terms (Granger, 1988). There is only one cointegrating equation and 
Granger-causality runs in only one direction. This result is in consonance with Ziramba 
(2008), Narayan et al. (2008) and Halicioğlu (2005) whose studies established the presence of 
a long run relationship between national income and public expenditure. 
Thus, economic growth leads to a larger share of government expenditures, but not 
the reverse. The empirical evidence seems to be most favourable to Wagner’s hypothesis 
rather than the Keynesian one. In fact, we can conclude that aggregate income Granger-
causes public expenditure. This finding is consistence with other studies that have found 
support for the Wagner’s law such as Wagner and Weber, 1977; Abisadeh and Gray, 
1985;Chang, 2002; Aregbeyen, 2006,  
 
6. Summary and Conclusion 
This paper has examined the empirical evidence of Wagner’s Law, which stated a long-run 
tendency for public sector to grow relative to aggregate income - and that of Augmented 
Wagner’s Law, according to which subsists a long-term relationship among public 
expenditure on one side and aggregate income and public deficit on the other side.  We 
applied causality tests within an error-correction framework for data over the period 1970 - 
2009 with seven formulations of Wagner’s Law for Nigeria. The unit root properties of the 
data were examined using the Augmented Dickey Fuller test(ADF) and Phillip Perron (PP) 
after which the cointegration test was conducted. The error correction models were also 
estimated in order to examine the short –run dynamics.  
The major findings include the following; The unit root tests shows that all the 
variables is stationary at first differences except the logarithm of the ratio of real government 
expenditure to real gross domestic product. Hence, we conclude that these variables are 
integrated of order 1. The cointegration test suggested that government expenditure and 
economic growth are cointegrated under max-eigen value test at 10% significance level, 
indicating an existence of long run equilibrium relationship between the two key variables. 
We found bi-directional causal relation for the short run dynamics of Models I, II, IV, 
V and VI, model III result revealed that component of government expenditure and national 
income are independent of each other (neutral effect on each other). More so, the study found 
a bi-directional causal relationship between government expenditure and budget deficit 
variables and also a unidirectional causality that causality run from real income to 
government expenditure, thus supporting Wagner’s law for Nigeria.  
The long run empirical evidence seems to be most favourable to Wagner’s hypothesis 
rather than the Keynesian one, therefore suggesting that aggregate income Granger - causes 
public expenditure. These findings are favourably consistence with results obtained in the 
literature (such as Omoke, 2009).  In conclusion, non-establishment of Keynesian view has 
indicated that the growth of public sector was not efficient policy. Therefore, policy makers 
should give more attention to private sector driven policy and adopt policies that will reduce 
unnecessary costs incurred by government’s involvement in economic activity, since 
government expenditures do not play a significant role in promoting economic growth. 
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